and by a number of U.S. government officials as citizen-suspects who lie outside American cultural norms, and as communities that harbor "sleeping " terrorists, posing a threat to the nation1s security. In this essay, we focus on how Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians have been framed and targeted through a process of criminalization that represents tRem as members of a deviant group whose belief system is distinctly IIforeign" and opposed to core American values. Members of this group are presumed to inherently support criminal actions defined as IIterrorist" activity. We argue that the ideological process of criminalization leads to the exclusion of Arab and South Asian Muslim Americans from full national belonging, or cultural citizenship.
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SUNAINA MAIRA is an associ. ate professor of Asian American Studies and the author of a forthcoming book on South Asian Muslim youth in the U.S. after 9/11, citizenshi p , and empire. whether these responses reveal alliance-building and pan-ethnic identification. Do the targeted groups, now' portrayed as mono lithic, find solidarity with each other, and if so, what are the bases for their sense of affinity? These questions force us to consider deeper issues of pan-ethnic and political affiliation that highlight quandaries at the core of Asian American studies: how does a pan-ethnic approach challenge or support the racial and cultural categories used by state and empire to subordinate and divide populations? Are there fruitful linkages that can be made be tween Asian American and Arab American studies that could il lunlinate these processes of social classification and shed light on geographic, national, and racial boundaries? Such questions are central to the vision and purpose of Asian American and Arab American studies. We seek to draw attention to common experi ences between the subjects of Asian American and Arab Ameri can studies to provide a critique of the conventional' boundaries established by ethnic and area studies, to uncover their link to state policies, and to bring forth a more radical vision for our intellec tual work in the post-9/ 11 moment.
Criminalization and Cultural Citizenship
Our argument hinges on the use of two major analytic concepts, criminalization and cultural citizenship, and their relationship to each other, to explain the targeting of Arabs, South Asians, and Muslims in the U.s. after 9/11. We define criminalization as a pro" cess by which the state creates and enforces penalties for actions that it claims violate public safety. Our critique of crimina liz a tion centers on state policies objectively unrelated to actual pub lic harm and on selective enforcement of laws so that particular groups are penalized, but not others. Criminalization is often dis cussed in relation to s\veeps, as when police usweep" certain ar eas of homeless persons before major events,3 or "sweep" youth preemptively off street corners, and clearances, through \vhich authorities "clear" members of targeted groups to carry on 'with daily life activities, a process expressed in the term "driving while Black." Criminalized groups are often tracked and moni tored. While the state attempts to legitimate these policies by claiming that the groups targeted are a public safety threat, in practice, their implementation reveals more than anything the powerlessness of the targeted groups. The War on Crime, the War on Drugs, and no\v the War on Terror share these features of criminalization processes. 4 Features of the domestic War on As multiethnic societies are forced to confront questions of differ ence that under g ird social inequality, it has become clear that the rights and obligations onegal citizenship are mediated by race, eth nicity, gender, and sexuality, as well as religion. These social loca tions-as much or more than legal citizenship-affect the extent to which a group feels and acts like a member of the nation-state in which it resides. 6 Cultural citizenship, according to anthropolo gist Lok Siu, consists of the "behaviors, discourses, and practices that give meaning to citizenship as lived experience" in the con text of "an uneven and complex field of structural inequalities," the "quotidian practices of inclusion and exclusion. " 7 Latino studies scholars Renato Rosaldo, William Flores, and clusion from cultural citizenship? We argue that the U.S. govern ment has targeted these groups both before and after 9/ 11 be cause of its particular political interests in t he regions fronl which these communities originate. The criminalization of these groups is linked to the rise of the U.s. as a global po·wer and to silencing dissent of its foreign policy objectives. Since 9/ 11, they have pro vided an internal and external scapegoat for the nation's foreign policy failures, the perceived sense of vulnerability of its inhabit ants, and its inability to protect its citizens. Excluding Arab and South Asian Muslims from cultural citizenship and criminaliz ing their communities is the ideological and practical work that builds popular support for sacrificing their civil rights for the presumed sense of safety of the majority, links them to "enemy" nations and combatants, and delegitimizes their dissent. Isolated as potentially disloyal, in part using notions of essential cultural difference that are diffused through the mainstream media and in popular culture representations, the profiling arid criminal ization of these groups by the state is tolerated by the public.
Arabs, Muslim, and South Asian Americans become accepted as cultural outsiders, so that what happens to them is (falsely) seen as not affecting anyone else. In the process, the state whittles away one democratic right after another, so that prolonged and secret detentions, detention without charge, and even torture of detainees become acceptable state practices in the name of Unational security."
Before 9/11, about 80 percent of the American public thought it was \vrong for law enforcement to use racial profiling, a term popularly used to refer to the disproportionate targeting of Af- The federal government's actions since 9/11 have led the American civil rights community to protest that it has over stepped its legitimate power in its mission to secure the U.S. and its borders.28 Legal experts point out that the state has engaged in measures that are "unnecessary, unconstitutional, and coun· terproductive."29 Many question whether selling "a vulnerable minority's rights ... in the name of security" has made the coun try safer, let alone \vhether this is even morally justifiable for a presumably democratic sOciety.3D The national security benefit of all these measures is highly questionable. An analysis of the out comes of nlore than 300 terrorism·related cases completed since 9/11 shows a pattern of plea-bargained convictions on charges uruelated to terrorism.31 When removal (deportation) is easier than proving a case, as in the case of non-citizens, the government has often taken the former option.
.
Special Registration: A Policy of Tracking and Removal
One selectively enforced and discriminatory federal policy is the U.S. government's "Special Registration" program. Their keepers, however, had only the homogenized image of the guilty Muslim in their minds. Eventually, most of these detain ees 'were released on bail and placed in removal (deportation) proceedings by the INS. The relatively affluent class position and organized nature of the Iranian American communit y in Los An geles enabled them to draw attention to their plight by launch ing a successful and speedy media campaign and string of pro tests around the country. The director of the Southern California chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) said the arrests \yere "remini scent of the internment of Japanese Ameri cans during World War 11 . "37
The Special Registration program was a massive round up of out-of-status Arabs, Asians, and North Africans from predomi nantly Muslim countries with few historical precedents in its scale.3S It used the selective enforcement of immigration laws to target members of these groups for deportation, although they ' comprised less than one percent of the estimated three million persons who were II out of status" and the eight million undocu mented in the United States.39 In addition, tens of thousands of Arabs and South Asians fled the United States rather than submit to Special Registration's tracking mechanisms. In Chicago, New York, and other cities, Pakistani neighborhoods and businesses ap peared to.be vacated almost overnight. Some families fled to the
Canadian border seeking political asylum. 
Community Impact of State Policies
In order to show the ways in which state policies have affected specific communities of Arabs, South Asians, and Muslims \ve briefly examine two urban areas, Chicago and Cambridge/Bos ton. It is interesting to juxtapose findings from South Asian, Arab, and Muslim communities in these two locales, which have been discussed much less than New York in the context of post-9/11 issues, and which have their own political, ethnic, and religious landscapes. We focus on the experiences of women in Chicago and youth in the Boston area, buildin g on our own research ex pertise, in order to she d light on the ways in which post-9/11 targeting has sha ped experiences of gender and generation.
Metropolitan Chicago
Metropolitan Chicago is h om e to a diverse Muslim community of around 400,000, including African Americans, South A sians, Arabs, East Europeans, and a growing number of c onver ts , a n d
Sh ort l y after the 9/11 attacks, one woman \vea r i ng a llijab was verb all y assaulted when a \vornan in the car next to her shouted; IIIf I had a gun 1'd shoot you n ow!" Other women re po rt ed their veils being ripped off their heads . Women who wear the hijab reported that Uthe stares , the refusal to look me in the face , and the verbal insults" pe rs is ted years after the attacks. Nearly all women interviewed, mulzajibaat (vei l e d) or not, still s ay they fear for their safety when they are in pl ac e s that lack ethnic diversity or areas that are all white. One Arab Muslim woman said , "You won't find me ih a p ark or a forest pre s e rv e," while an othe r said , "Soccer moms scare me the most. " All a gre ed that Muslim women who wear the lrijab arc th e most vulnerable to assault in A mer i c an sodety, because they are so e as il y spotted and targeted.
Feeling unsafe is not limited to the public sphere. The federal govern me nt' s pattern of interrogations , a rr e st s, home invas ions , spying, and property confiscations appear random , un foc us ed, and discriminatory to members of the Arab and Muslim c ommunity. T he government's use of secretevidence, closed h e arin gs , eavesdropping on attorneys, and special registration of Arabs and South Asian Muslims have not built commu ni ty confidence in the government, or in the claim that i t s only target is terrorists and people who support them. As a consequence, nearly everyone in the c ommun it y feels vulnerable to a certain degree, even in their own homes . Consider that after the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement authorities received 96,000 anonymous tips from persons reporting on Arab , Sout h Asian , and Muslim neighbors . 56 Post-9/11 racism has spilled over into the work site and in job J t;ji to (l) ,... . !a.. Interfaith alliances also surfaced in Chicago during the post-9/11 period as grassroots interfaith activists formed a protec tive circle around the Bridgeview mosque in the days after the 9/11 attacks. Imm i grant ri ghts coalitions and civil ri ghts groups strengthened their working relationships with Ch ica go'S Arab, South Asian, and Muslim communities because of shared con cerns over the government's poli cies. To gether they protested the government's Spe ci al Registration program and deportations, assenlbling with banners at the federal b uildin g and offering sup port to registtees. Gi ven their pre-9 /11 experiences of subordination and federa l governm ent profiling, Chicago's A rab community alrea dy had strong ties ,yUh National Lawyers Guild attorneys and progressive ethnic coalitions. These external al1iances are particularly important since Arab, Sou th Asian, and Muslim community resources have been redirected and extensively depleted a fter 9/11 due to the financial demands of legal defense and civil rights ,york. There is less evidence, however, of the critical next step, ,�hen communities of Latinos, Afri can Americans, Arabs, and South Asians 'would march together for their common interests. This type of solidari ty requ ires anoth er level of work that must emerge fr om within Arab, South Asian, African American and Latino grassroots community organizations and is complicated by class-based relationships between and among the�e groups .
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The fault lines, as well as potential fluidity, of traditional Asian
American organizing were widely evident after 9/11, when the zation to defend them. Fitting neatly into neither Arab nor Asian categories, as these two pan-ethnic groups have been traditionally defined and organized in the U.S., they found themselves without any representation to challenge their treatment. Post-9/11 exp eriences have drawn these groups together, transcending traditional boundaries of race and geography, which they ha d no role in establishing.
Boston
In the af termath of 9111, it becam e apparent that Arab and South Asian Muslim youth in the U.S. were being dramatically forced to confront their belonging in the nation-state. This section focuses in particular on South Asian Mus lim immigrant youth and draws on findings from an ethnographic stu dy conducted in [2001] [2002] [2003] of working-class, Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi immigrant students in the publi c high school in Cambridge, Massachusetts and the impact of 9/11 on their notions of cultural citizenship.57
The research also involved intervi ews with immigrant parents, school staff, community and religious leaders, city officials, and community activists. 
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The Ca.mbridge public high school has an extremely diverse student body that reflects the city's changing population, with students from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia.58
The South Asian immigrant student population is predominant ly working-to lower-middle class and most work after school in part-time jobs in the service sector, such as fast food or retail. The majority of the Indian immigrant youth are from Sunni Muslim families, most from small towns or villages in Gujarat in We stern India.
While local Muslim organizations or mosques in the Boston area draw a diverse Arab, North Africanl, Asian, and African Ameri can population, the families of these working-class South Asian inunigrant youth tend to socialize mainly with people from their own ethnic community. Furthermore, they generally do not affil iate with the Indian·American or Pakistani American community organizations in the Boston area either, which tend to involve middle-to upper-middle class, suburban families. 59 In some in stances, class boundaries within South Asian American commu nities persisted and undermined community cohesiveness after issue within the Indian imnligrant community. One of the Gujara-' ti leaders interviewed for this study refused to comment on the inclusion of Muslims in his organization; other Indian commu nity leaders were less defensive and some had even participated in marches for peace in South Asia during the military conflict on the Indo-Pakistani border and so presumably were more critical of communalism or nationalism in South Asia. However, in gen-
.... .. What was striking was the ways in which some South Asian Muslim youth seemed to go beyond simply expressing ideas of cultural -difference and commonality, in a lll ulticulturalist vein, to actually grapple with ideas about political and structural similarities others. Some of the students had gained a deeper understanding of their commonalities with African American youth as a result of their experiences with anti-Muslim racism, which they compared to anti-Black racism. Other South Asian immigrant youth, particularly the Muslim boys, felt targeted by other high school youth after 9/11. Accusations of "you're a terrorist" or "you're a bin Laden" entered into what might otherwise be just an outbreak of youthful aggression among boys, perhaps, but had now become a part of a national discourse about 1s1a111. Ye t, some of the boys, in particular, who had been targets of anti-Muslim incidents felt closer to the experiences of racial profiling endured by African Americans, as a result, and shared a critique of the U.S.'s racist policies toward people of color. One of the boys commented that, in his view, African Americans were not as shattered by the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. because they feel alienated from the nation-state due to the legacy of slavery. While this racialized difference after 9/11 is obviously more complex, what is important is that some youth believed that African Americans share their experience of marginalized cultural citizenship ,vithin .� e ClI the nation. While these young people are not involved in formal political organizations, they had a political analysis of the post-9/11 climate that led to inter-racial affiliations.
In 
Alliances
One of the interestiIlg things to note in the political rhetoric used by those discussing, and even protesting, the "racial profiling" of South Asian, Arab, and Muslim Americans is that the racial ambiguities of all three categories are generally not fully acknowledged in this discourse. Moustafa Bayoumi calls this the "tragic irony" of "racial profiling" after 9/11.61 Muslim identity is not, technically, a racial category but in speaking of "anti-Muslim racism," for example, it is apparent that Muslim identity is treated as if it were a racial category by processes that are similar to those that comprise racial profiling in the U.S., for example, "flying while Muslinl," referring to the profiling of Muslim and Arab passengers at airports and on air p lanes, or "speaking out while
Arab/ Palestinian/' referring to the censorship of pro-Palestine political speech. Race is, after all, a social and ideological construction and so the criminalization of Muslim Americans shows that Islam increasingly operates as a racial category in public discourse as well as practice.
Arabs and South Asians are both groups that have been ambiguously racialized in the U.S., variously classified as "white" and non-white at different moments. In 1923, the Supreme Court , I
Ejl a � Arabs have rejected their official designation as Caucasian and white, because of their treatment in American society (a sentiment crystallized after 9/11), because Arabs c�mprise a range of phenotypes and cannot be contained by the concept of race, and because they basically disagree with organizing people by color. As long as they remain officially \vhite, they are, ineligible for the benefits that accrue to members of recognized minority groups and, more critically, they remain invisible to persons concerned with the status of minorities.67 While some had thought Arabs and Muslims were on the path to gaining cultural citizenship in the U.S., post-9/ 11 events changed all that. The questions nearly all have been asked, such as Uwhere are you from?" and "are you a terrorist?," and comments telling them to "go back where you came from" revealed the borderlines between whiteness and otherness. The overwhelming consistency of responses in a post-9/ 11 study indicating that ArabAmericans feel least safe among whites shows that violent back-
lash is a phenomenon associated by them 'with white America. The everyday cultural and social processes that accompany the state-driven "war on terror" construct Arabs and Muslims as not entitled to the same rights and privileges (i.e., cultural citizenship) that accrue to members of white society or /lreal" Americans, in cluding the privilege against profiling and guilt by association. Federal government actions only serve to reinforce this idea. One often hears Muslims in Chicago remark that after the Oklahoma City bombings by Timothy McVeigh and his associates, neither all Christians nor all Irish became suspect citizens. The privileged are treated ,vith individual precision, the non-privileged are pro filed and punished collectively. However, since heightened U.S. nationalism and xenophobia have filtered into other immigrant and minority communities, some parts of these communities have absorbed anti-Arab racism and Islamophobia, making this a more complex and difficult issue. 68 For many South Asian and Arab AmericansJ the post-9/11 backlash was a lesson in the ideological construction of race in the U.S. Some who believed that they would be shielded from racism because they \vere wealthy and inhabited predominantly white spaces found their "model minority" status stripped from them. It i� important to show links between the social position ing of Arab and South Asian Americans to Uncover the 'ways in which racial formation in the U.S. conjoins issues of material privi lege, legal re g ulation, and state power. There are important alli ances that need to be forged between these and other communi ties that ,vould go beyond the confines of multiculturalist II differ ence" and build connections based on an analysis of political and material processes. For example, South Asian, Arab, and Muslim Americans who now have heightened concerns about issues of detention have much to learn from African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans who have long fought against racism especially that of the prison-industrial complex, and advocated for the rights of political prisoners. They have much to learn as well as from the historical experiences of Japanese Americans, who were incarcerated during Wo rld War II. The latter alliance was made more visibly than the first after 9/11, through pub:' lic statements of solidarity by Japanese American activists and documentary films that visually linked the experiences of both communities. Ye t in order for there to be a deeper alliance be tween subordinated groups in the U.S., these symbolic alliances need to go beyond a politics of representation and address the . historical impact of U.S. empire. Ye t it is also true that responses by South Asian, Arab, and Muslim Americans themselves often remain \vithin the realm of the symbolic and are enacted through protests that make visual and discursive statemehts, instead of ongoing political campaigns that challenge the very premise and goals of the state's profiling and link it larger imperial policies in the Middle East and South Asia.
Conclusion
The question of whether and how Arab Americans and South Asian Americans should \york together, and how to define the relationship of Arab Americans to Asian Americans, raises two important issues mentioned at the beginning of this essay: the meaning of solidarity, and second, the role of boundari�s. Soli darity, Vijay Prashad reminds us, is a desire that is actualized through a " tremendous act of production" for NUllity is not wait ing to happen.u69 The identities that bind Asian Americans to Arab Americans need not be just of shared victirnhood, but could be based in shared histories of contact and trade preceding West ern hegemony, in common visions of liberation from colonialism, in collective memories of nationalist struggle, and in the alliances forged between newly independent Arab and South Asian na tion-states by the non-aligned movement.70 It is in this political and epistemological spirit that we need to reconsider the bound aries between Asian American and Arab American studies. A strategicallY 'cotuparative approach rooted in a shared history and vision of solidarity, rejecting externally imposed divisions, ·would help keep in sight the political \york of boundaries: aca demic, geographic, and cultural. The New Press, 2002).
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